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Abstract
The Accident pyramid must be investigated at its bottom part to find causal relations in latent area of failure. Nowadays, we need 
to work with new methods to analyse the deviation within organizational environment. The omission and commission are human 
errors that must be investigated as social phenomena. The Objective of this research is insert social aspects, considered dynamic, 
in a LNG control room project based on ISO 11064, EEMUA201. After identification of risks in the technology, a discussion is 
begun about social and cognitive risks where we can find the causes to cognition failure. The quality of social and cognitive
functions are identified and adjusted to result in desired group profile. After understanding how work the operation, what are the 
requirements to work, job organization at site, what are the safety culture and organization aspects, the critical activities, the 
rules, and the risk sceneries at project, we need to understand the regional legislation, stereotypes, and local archetypes with 
respective rules of behaviour. Some aspects of project can be adjusted with social-cognitive demands as alarm management, 
layout of control room, and information management. Some ergonomic aspects need to be discussed in crossing with social and 
cognitive characteristics. Screen information and respective density, alarm organization, layout, number of screens, feedback, 
clarity, standardization, automation, and complexity are aspects maybe actuate in different way, depending on social aspects 
cognitive and their impacts. Using social-human techniques we can find these relations and after a test can suggest approaches in 
criteria from EMUA and ISO. The social aspects that are discussed and that impact on cognitive functions are: excess flexibility, 
paternalism, centralism, regionalism, cooperation level, and multiculturalism at work. 
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1. Introduction
The behavior of the accident represented by the pyramid Bird [1] needs to be investigated in its base to identify 
causal relationships in the latent area of failure. Currently need to work on new methods to analyze the deviation is born 
due to organizational environment which induces human error. The omission and commission are human errors that 
need to be investigated in the class of social phenomena. Human factors in the task and their installed types (social, 
human, and technical) in the productive system and organizational structure should be analyzed in routine situations 
and critical emergency situations. The model of Reason [2] to the accident suggests installation of new physical and 
logical barriers to avoid failure, but does not discuss the possibility of reduced quality of psychological processes with 
the complexity of the task. The model of Reason does not discuss whether the task is appropriate in the case of complex 
functions.
The fatality is the result of events that occur serially or in parallel whose controls or barriers are not effective. The 
anthropometric ergonomics-related events occur in the visible field of the fault, the top of the pyramid. At the base of 
the pyramid toward the root cause are located organizational aspects that can initiate or block a process fails. The 
teamwork when omits information [3] or does not communicate achievements adopts underreporting of events in the 
safety area - deviations are not reported at the time that happen complicating control actions.
The objective of this research is to insert social and cognitive aspects that are considered dynamic in the conceptual 
stage of an ergonomic design Liquefied Natural Gas facility. An adaptation of ISO Standard 11064 and EEMUA 201 to 
attend the activities in the control room will be prepared. After identifying the risks of technology, start a debate on the 
cognitive and social risks where you can find the causes of cognitive impairment, such as omission.      
Cognitive functions in the execution of work activities involve activities in the cycles of thinking, deciding, of 
acting, and the analysis of socio-economic and emotional utility [4]. The balance between these functions during task 
execution prevents the appearance of human error. The quality of social and cognitive functions, implemented in 
planning and task execution is identified, measured and adjusted to result in great profile in the realization of the group. 
After the understanding of how the work of industrial operations need to understand about the cultural relations that 
influence the task. The operation of the work depends on materials and informational requirements that are defined in 
task design. At the same time, the organization's culture and safety culture are discussed and analyzed for the type of 
activity, process and product at the factory. In the safety culture of the analysis are identified acceptable rules of 
behavior within the industrial site based on project scenarios. The subjective analysis of this work includes: 
identification and relationship of local and global archetypes that influence worker behavior rules; identifying patterns 
of behavior acceptable to the legislation and voluntary rules of global operation of companies in the sector; and the 
analysis of the local population 'performances (stereotypes) for adjustments in the rules of work.
Some aspects of the project should be adjusted to allow for organizational resilience in the results. Thus, local or 
global behavior characteristics require changes in process equipment emitting state signals (which increase the 
perception abnormality), and settings in communication tools. Clearly and objectively is necessary to amend the 
premises alarm design, the layout of the control room, the type of information that flows to decision making, 
information management and communication tools, instrumentation level class safety, types of equipment / instruments 
as the ease of access, and characteristics of the operator's job.
2. Analysis of EEMUA 201 & ISO STANDARD 11064
At this time will be analyzed the ISO 11064 standards and the EEMUA 201 for control room projects [5] [6] [7] [8] 
and its various criteria for further work cross-relationships between social, cognitive and physical aspects indicated by 
these standards. The control of operations should enable the long-term maintenance of normal operation punctuated by 
deviations that require greater effort in the work of the operator [8]. It is likely that the transition between normal 
operation and the abnormality to be given quickly and without prior notice, making the realization of proactive actions 
to recover the normal state. For these cases of rapid change, there are human limitations that should be analyzed to 
adapt the control room project. The operator behavior characteristics cannot be met by the classic design of the control 
room due to regional and multicultural aspects of the job.
The behavior to decide in real situations of abnormalities cannot be considered in the selection of persons or 
equipment. For emergency cases is necessary the presence of workers on staff who know how to decide in high-risk 
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situations and workload, ie high level of stress. A test for operational decisions in the control of high-risk or high stress 
level operations can be interesting to select people, interfaces, alarm systems and allocation of roles in the operation. 
Managers believe that a good operator in a position to "Sea Admiral" (stable operation) performs the functions the 
same way as in an emergency or operating out of control.
Physical access to screens, keyboards and pointing beyond the number and physical layout of the workstations is 
considered in control room design and depend on man's physical layout at work. The speed of response of the 
interfaces as the mouse and the system reset should be considered to describe which human actions can be performed 
and which cannot adapt to the automation to the current situation. Sometimes this interpretração does not consider 
regional behaviors and does not perform adaptations. The visual appearance of the devices allow for the differentiation 
and functions to prevent misidentification action on controls and equipment. These logical and physical devices 
signaling, control and action must follow the guidance of the task. The graphics and alarms that help control also 
follow the guidance of the task. In the case of alarms, the operator must know how to differentiate the types of priority, 
be able to identify new alarms in relation to those already known, and the color convention to navigate the screen.
On the other hand the workstation needs to be scaled to the required drives with the appropriate layout for access to 
devices and tools [9], and with sufficient lighting to discern the types of control. The characteristics of the work 
environment must have suitable temperature-controlled noise, and to prevent any distractions that may diminish the 
insight necessary for decisions avoiding the choice of unsuitable alternatives.
The work environment design and control system should focus on improving human performance in operating 
activities. What is sought is to understand how the process works and apply understood controls. Regional behavior, 
local or global behavior influence over control of processes and should be analyzed. The ergonomic design for ISO 
11064 based control room is divided into principles, control device design, procedures for scaling the control room, 
procedures and physical requirements for workstation design, and checklist for project implementation, project to 
external environmental factors. The control room design should be focused on human factors in the design stages and 
through adjustments to the feedback of the operation.
It is important to be clear in the manuals for training and physical view of the equipment and controls, the purposes 
and project constraints to avoid situations of lack of control and injury hazards. The definition of the requirements for 
improving human performance in the control room of tasks require diagnoses that go beyond the engineering function 
and crosses social and cognitive psychology discussions.
The EEMUA standards and iso11064 discuss the same items: the jobs for the control of operations, control devices 
with the flow of information, the factors that influence the design, construction, and hierarchy of screens. This 
discussion is based on the critical discussion of human and organizational factors based on discussion and Glathea 
Kempfb [5] and Schaffer [7].
The size and organization of the workstation depend on the number of people who control systems and position the 
operator occupies (sitting or standing). According to Santos et al [9], improper layout of the room and control systems 
can impair circulation and the signs of understanding creating an environment conducive to the event of human error.
The intervention in process control is facilitated when the equipment and instruments appear in accordance 
operation screen they are arranged in the field - the task of mental planning is more assertive including facilitating find 
the task of object equipment and how to perform the necessary actions to control. The ease of switching between 
detailed view with operating conditions and overview giving idea of process flow and its consequence assists the task 
of planning and the analysis of impacts while in achievement.
The supervisory tools must have easy handling and quick application, for the equipment control, making the control 
room work simpler and showing the possibility of release danger based on the history of this type of process. This 
indicative facilitates the anticipation of action by the operator. Alarms when arranged by functional groups allows for 
setting the display with the controls. The amount of alarms and screens that are accompanied by the operation depends 
on cognitive limitations of perception of the state of normalcy and problem analysis. The tools design to the 
supervisory control rooms is influenced by the complexity of the processes, such as plant automation, plant size, 
process complexity and redundancy. The industrial plants that do not have a high level of automation require the 
operator to perform many manual operations such as opening and closing valves - demanding more screens for
operation. The size of the plant sets the number of digital inputs and analog outputs or necessary for its control. When 
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industrial plants are very complex they require a large number of screens. In complex processes is necessary to use an 
overview of the processes and the use of detail screens of processes.
In building an application for supervisory processes is very important to follow the pecking order of the screens - the 
same should be done when designing a task. The project should always start with the overview of the plant indicating 
all existing units. When selected one of the units in the overview screen of the plant, it must call a new screen with the 
overview of the selected unit.
3. Investigation in SITES of LNG
According to ABSG [10], SANDIA REPORT [11][12]:  LNG is natural gas that has been cooled in the cryogenic 
liquid condition such that can be embedded in the ship for long distance trips to reach end customers. Once the LNG 
ship reaches its destination, unloading terminal, LNG is unloaded and stored in large tanks until its re-gasification and 
delivery by pipeline to a network of natural gas. LNG is a dangerous liquid because it is at cryogenic state and is a 
flammable gas, natural gas. The dangers related to LNG result of three of its properties: cryogenic temperatures, 
characteristics of rapid dispersion, and high flammability content. The LNG, packed in very low temperature, can cause 
direct damage and losses in the installation. A vapor cloud formed by LNG spill could travel into the wind to populated 
areas. This LNG can ignite the gas concentration is between five and fifteen percent in air, in the presence of an 
ignition source. Most of the information related to Safety and Inspections Natural Gas pipes is rated Critical structure 
due to the amount of energy that circulates with specific engineering due to their vulnerabilities requiring detailed 
information for projects: (1) related to information about the production, generation, transmission or distribution of 
energy; (2) could be useful to analyze the situation of a person attack this critical infrastructure; (3) is mandatory for 
example meet the demand of open information in the sector; (4) provides strategic information indicating the location 
of critical infrastructure. A number of laws, regulations, standards and guidelines are currently presented to prevent and 
indicate lessons learned from the consequences of leaks with LNG. Several accidents occurred in the World as a result 
of the activities of LNG with different impacts including fatalities: 1944, Cleveland, Ohio; 1964 and 1965 Methane 
Progress (Arzew, Algeria); 1969 Portland, Oregon; 1972, Montreal East, Quebec, Canada; 1979 Cove Point, Maryland; 
1983, Bontang, Indonesia; 1987 Test in Nevada Factory, Mercury, Nevada; 2004, Trinidad, Tobago; 2004 
Ghislenghien, Belgium; 2005, District Heights, Maryland. LNG plants must have reinforcements to avoid the risk of 
accidents. After the explosion of the pipeline in PEMEX in Reynosa (2013) with 33 fatalities, the company has been 
advised of the need to address human factors, from the design phase through to operation.
4. Methodology
The objective of this research is to insert social and cognitive aspects, considered dynamic, in the conceptual 
phase of ergonomic designs for LNG sites (ISO 11064, EEMUA 201) focused on control room activities. After 
identifying the risks of the technology (process and product) a discussion is started on the social and cognitive risks 
where there is the possibility of causing cognitive impairment as the default. The balance between thinking, 
decision, action and the task utility, may decrease the likelihood of human error. The steps of the methodology are: 
(1) Background, (2) analysis of the project, (3) Ergonomic Analysis; (4) Task Analysis; and (5) Cross-Analysis and 
design criteria change.
Step 1: The goal in context is to understand how the project will start operations by reading technology, visits and 
interviews. Identify what are the requirements to work through the application and interpretation of survey results. The 
organization of work in industrial site must be identified with safety aspects and the Company's organizational rules. 
To change the project is essential to understand the operating team behavior rules and the rules for defining the risk of 
product and process in industrial design. The critical activities must be mapped for further analysis requirements. Step 
2: In the engineering design analysis is made a discussion of ergonomics and that influence human performance as 
alarm management, control room layout, information management, SIL, human-machine interface, equipment design, 
and workstation design. On the other hand the critical procedures are studied, activities and equipment at the receiving 
logistics, transportation and regasification of natural gas. From the risk analysis of critical equipment, processes, 
activities and entrepreneurship in LNG site (HAZOP, LOPA, SIL, and APP APR) the principal risks and where human 
factors can interfere with these risks are identified. Step 3: The activities involved in ergonomic analysis and social and 
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cognitive aspects are: (1) compare the descriptive design with standards: ISO 11064 Parts 1-7 and EEMUA 201; (2) to 
verify what are the critical ergonomic aspects where the analysis must be more detailed, taking into account the 
physical and cognitive effort; (3) understand what the premises of the control room and the workstation; (4) analyze the 
interaction and interface between systems and the man; (5) analyze the environmental factors at work; (6) identify the 
social dangers through the APP-SH techniques; (7) Review the emergency and the possibility of incorrect decisions in 
high stress situations; (8) Application preliminary analysis of risk and HAZOP Social; (9) study on risk classes, 
dynamism, and implications for ergonomic study; (10) understand about the deviations of the project in relation to ISO 
11064 and EEMUA 201; (11) understand the complementarities and recommendations given by the analysis of social 
and cognitive risks. Step 4: Analysis of critical seeks to zero accident tasks. Measurements to achieve the task 
successfully involve analyzing requirements, risk and complexity. Moreover, the records resulting from the task should 
be sufficient to classify the likelihood of human error and what influencer’s human factors on the effectiveness of the 
task. Step 5: Cross-analysis of information on environment and social aspects that can induce cognitive impairment in 
performing tasks in the control room indicates which aspects and criteria of the standard that must be reviewed. The 
identification and analysis of critical tasks is the result of requirements analysis, complexities and risks [13] [14] as 
well as analysis of the failed task. From the failure analysis in the task is possible to classify human errors and verify 
their probability. LNG facilities may be new not having task of performing background, so is adopted, borrowed way, 
the history of other older similar plants, LPG for example. The social aspects are identified through preliminary 
analysis techniques hazards and socio-human risk [15] and the cognitive aspects and environmental aspects through the 
Social HAZOP [16].
From the achievements already made in plants begins the discussion about the control room ergonomics and the 
possibility that social and cognitive aspects, not previously identified, can cause human error (cross-analysis - Table 
1). Experiments on industrial units are: (1) REFINING with the implementation of Social HAZOP; (2) LPG to the 
study of the characteristics of the process involving flammable gas, compression and ship loading; (3) LPG with the 
application of techniques for decision making in emergency and to analyze the critical task; and (4) PLATFORM 
with risk analysis human partner and social relations that induce the error. These experiences and the discussion of 
the EEMUA requirements and ISO in Oil and Gas facilities control rooms allowed the identification of critical 
human factors that impact on functional parts of the control room.
5. Discussion about Ergonomic, Social and Cognitive Aspects
Ergonomic aspects are discussed, cross-with the social, emotional, cognitive and intuitive, which is influenced by 
archetypes and local and global culture, identifying intensity in the relationship and the need to adapt. The control 
room items mentioned in the two standards and that are affected by social and cognitive characteristics in the 
workplace are: (A) design and layout of control stations: organization of the physical space by providing the transit 
of people and information for the control of operations; (B) Operating screen information, layout and density 
(quantity, access and density); (C) operability of the devices and facilities for the operation; (D) alarm system 
organization, layout on the screen and priorities based on causal link failure; (E) the number and layout of the 
screens: number of screens in the control room and number of control systems or screen for signaling, and also 
number of screens to be accompanied by operator, and also number of alarms monitored by the operator; (F) Ease of 
navigation on the monitor in the control room; (G) Clarity, Consistency and standardization in the transmission of 
information in the reports, the records, the standards and oral communication; (H) level flexibility in operations 
avoiding risky situations and allowing the fitting procedures already performed in practice; (I) return information for 
the operation of actions taken; (J) presentation of information and screen layout (animation, flash, format): 
configuration screens as colors, noises and type of representation for equipment and processes; (K) Emergency 
Screens: provision of screens and information on the screens in emergency situations to allow the decision-making; 
(L) Plant Automation: automation level measured by the number of closed controls and number of marked signals to 
the control of installations for energy production volume that can be released by the plant accident situation; (M) 
size of the plant indicating the inventory of product that is released produces a specific impact due to their 
characteristics; (N) complexity of operations involving aspects of the process (recycles), process control 
(automation), task (external information), the attention and memory task (number of tasks performed), relationship 
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between main and auxiliary tasks; (O) Redundancy: level of redundancy in critical systems and the possibility of the 
phenomenon "cognitive laziness"; (P) Segregated stations; and (Q) screens hierarchy of identification in the control 
room as well as the hierarchy of activities in the critical task.
Discussion of social aspects and witch are relations that alter cognition. The question that arises is, considering 
the social traits, affective, cognitive and intuitive, local and global, which criteria from control room design need to 
be reworked or revised? Using reliability analysis techniques and risk in the area human partner can be located after 
these relationships and test on a small group of people acting in certain types of control are suggested adjustments to 
the criteria set by EEMUA and ISO. The techniques listed to identify the traits are: LODA - review of the decision 
of the operator stress [17]; APRSH - Preliminary Analysis of Human Socio Risk [15]; Social HAZOP - Analysis of 
cognitive functions and environmental influence on operations in critical equipment [16]; FMEA H - Failure mode 
and effect analysis including human factors [18]; Analysis of the critical task as the safety requirements [19] and the 
risk based on the complexity [13]; and identification of classes and valuation of human error probability based on 
expert opinion and projection of future claim [17].
The social aspects that negatively impact on cognitive functions in individual and group activities from the 
control room of a LNG facility are [20] [21] [22] [23]: (a) behavior in emergency situations; (b) excessive flexibility 
leading to poor alternatives in decision making; (c) paternalism and protection of groups not generating the 
identification of the failure process; (d) centralization in the decision in routine and emergency situations; (e) 
passivity or difficulty in seeing the need for action - spectator posture; (f) level of leadership and implications 
(genuine level with or without authority, not genuine level with authority); (g) regional characteristics indicating 
population stereotypes to be respected; (h) affective connection with the work resulting in compromise; (i) level of 
cooperation resulting from the organization's characteristics, leadership and group installed; (j) communication tools 
and perception of the message by the group; (k) fast-action features (almost impulse) and implications for the 
effectiveness of the task; and (l) multiculturalism at work and implications for various areas such as communication 
and cooperation in group activities. These social aspects can induce human error and accidents therefore need to be 
identified, analyzed and prioritized.
Cognitive characteristics [24] may be wrongly identified to function due to the non-recognition of current 
behaviors or they may be amended in the light of social or organizational changes. These features need to be 
understood for the criteria of change in the control room project. Among these we can relate: (m) level of 
perception; (n) type of care and efficiency in the application; (o) recovering operations and memory (short term or 
long term); (p) decision making and features (routine, complexity, and emergency level); (q) levels of skills installed 
and performed the task; (r) levels of knowledge installed and used and ability to create new concepts, dynamic 
knowledge; (s) commitment to the resulting task of identifying the individual and organizational values; (t) facility 
for diagnosis of complex and simple situations; (u) cognitive workload and processing the resulting information; (v)
physical effort in the logistics of moving materials and persons; and (w) relationship between comfort, fatigue and 
pain in the workplace. In the case of LNG plant presented single-unit operations of transformation of the physical 
condition, and at high risk of explosion and fire, we perform the intersection of social, cognitive related to the 
control room design considering the level of influence. Always taking into account the social environment can 
modify the cognitive processing by changing how to operate industrial plants.
6. Analysis criteria for adjustment – EEMUA, ISO
As shown in Table 1, the standards set criterion is applied in critical relationships (blue) which can cause human 
error. Thus, the hero archetype may affect the decision in emergency situations and that can be avoided if a specific 
work of studies on the emergency screen is made. For example, adoption of critical variables in the LNG plant relate 
to a single control device. Another possibility is to indicate the chain reaction, with bright colors, where the release 
of danger, so the blast vessels and furnaces in LNG plants and the release of fireball. Excessive flexibility identified 
through risk analysis technique and quantified by FIROB technique, for example, can impact on the functions of 
attention and perception affecting emergency situations or in complex operations it is important to review the view 
of the screens, the provision of emergency screens, and ease to increase the operability of the control systems. The 
centralization on the other hand affects the result of complex operations requiring systems operability review.
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Table 1 - Matrix relations of the cognitive and social aspects of the control room project. High Value - dark blue
The attitude of the staff of the viewer brings risks to perception, attention and decision in an emergency situation. 
To reduce the possibility of human error must act in the design criteria changing the alarm system organization, 
avoid excessive automation putting cognitive checking routines automated action. The leadership style on the other 
hand affects the development of skills and control of complex operations requiring revisions to the control systems 
to enhance the operability and at the job level of standardization and writing beyond the return of the operation on 
routine occurrences. The type of affective ties the employee to the company, in the case of LNG company involved 
with high risk of fire and explosion, directly affects the commitment to the task results and a breakdown of 
diagnostic investigations - this can be fixed through revisions the ergonomic design: operability, feedback, controls 
for large size and high complexity in LNG plants. Low cooperation affects the perception of problems requiring 
more live screens. Inadequate communication screen hinders the perception of abnormalities requiring revision in 
supervisory screen. The impulsive style of performing the tasks affects emergency decisions and overall operations 
requiring corrections in the alarm system and operability of the LNG plant. And multiculturalism can promote 
communication failure requiring corrections in the project as the clarity, consistency and standardization. Interfaces 
between system and man: the main criteria that must be changed in ISO and EEMUA standards for control room 
design in LNG plant are: control device configuration for multiple variables in an emergency situation, trend setting 
in danger release in chain reactions, so display screens to increase awareness, better operability of systems, 
cognitive check the automatic actions, robustness in feedback systems for large and complex plants, and clarity in 
writing for multicultural team. Requirements Organizational environment, Cognitive and Technical: the main 
requirements that need to be changed in the organizational environment that affects the processing of cognitive 
machine can cause failures in the control room at LNG plant are excessive flexibility, spectator posture, leadership, 
bond affective with work, communication style and speed of response. These environmental factors affect the 
following cognitive aspects: perception, attention, emergency decision, complex operation, ability, commitment and 
profile for diagnosis.
7. Conclusion
Although the frequency of accidents in the risk industry has decreased with the automation Process Safety 
systems, the severity of these accidents has increased potentially, probably due to increased complexity of the task 
and reducing operators responsible for controlling large amount of danger. So the risk is regarded as dynamic and 























Perception B D EF EF B
Atention B OD B
Memmory D D D D
Routine decision IJQ IJQ
Emergency decision K K K D
Simple operation C
Complex operation C C L CL
Skills GHI
Knowledgement K L
Commitmment GH GH MNO
Diagnosys CIN




(A)  Design and layout of stations
(B)  Operation screen information
(C)  Operability of the control device
(D)  Alarm system organization
(E)  Number and layout of the screens 
(F)  Ease of navigation on the monitor
(G)  Clarity, Consistency and standardization
(H)  Flexibility level operations
(I) Feedback information for the operation
(J)  Presentation of information and screen layout
(K)  Emergency Screen: provision and Information
(L)  Automation and controls
(M)  Size of the plant - product inventory
(N)  Complexity of operations (recycle)
(O)  Redundancy: critical system "cognitive laziness"
(P)  Segregated stations
(Q)  Identification of the hierarchy of screens
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leakage scenario of the products in chemical or nuclear processes. The operator controls the industrial plants from 
automated systems is inserted in a social environment bringing external features (archetypal behaviors) into the 
control room. It is essential that the ergonomic design and procedures in the control room to be adjusted to enable 
maximum efficiency of this control. Communication tools should be adjusted, the type of task, and reviewed the 
information and processing in the control room changed to meet the dynamic risk analysis recommendations in the 
case of release of chemical, flammable and toxic hazards. The danger of viewing general framework and 
prioritization of signals to be perceived, processed, treated and diagnoses are part of this review in the control room 
design criteria. Regional characteristics are inserted in the discussion reaching a project with organizational 
resilience.
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